What is a strategy of ‘variable geometry’, and does it promise a reinvigorated Canadian brand of diplomacy? According to Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, variable geometry offers flexibility to selectively engage particular coalitions of interest on different issues, creating a web of connections that will form the fulcrum of multilateral responses to global challenges. The relationship between the geometric points in Carney’s network is hence not tied by common values, but rather by pragmatic coalescence on issues of common concern. On paper, this is a radical departure from the policies of former Liberal leader and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, focusing less on values-based engagement and more on realpolitik-esc, interest-based relationships.
To the extent that variable geometry represents a complete break from previously held Canadian foreign policy principles, such as the ‘responsible conviction’ ethos, can be debated. To be sure, values have not been completely abrogated from Carney’s vision. In his address to both houses of the Australian Parliament in March, Carney invoked the “shared values and common battles” that create the filial ‘strategic cousins’ bond shared by Canada and Australia, referencing shared values around freedom, self-governance, and self-determination. What variable geometry ostensibly changes is the weight of such values in Canada’s strategic calculus, particularly with respect to relationships not couched in shared values. Carney’s re-engagement with both China and India, for example, re-centres pragmatic cooperation on issues such as trade.
With this in mind, the variable geometry concept offers Canada the scalability to engage in greater depth with partners in Southeast Asia, who, with variation, pursued pragmatic strategies long before the current terrain shift in geopolitics. Canada’s commitment to the region has long been criticized by ASEAN for its transience and lack of consistent long-term presence beyond economic engagement. The ‘fair-weather’ friend label that Canada has borne in Southeast Asia was something that the 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy, released by the Justin Trudeau Liberal government, was designed to address. Even then, a space was carved out for Canada to engage and “find common ground” with partners in the region that “have different views and values”. Whilst not ‘variable geometry’ in name, the 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy sings from a similar songbook.
Much of the criticism of the 2022 IPS is not that it addresses the wrong issues, but rather that it hasn’t made the tangible adjustments the strategy promised. Trade and investment with ASEAN still lag behind those of global competitors, and Canada’s on-the-ground presence remains largely sclerotic. For Carney’s variable geometry to succeed, it must overcome the same challenges: namely, the domestic mobilization of industry and capital and the creation of cohesion among common interest groupings.
Barriers to capital and resource mobilization will be a major obstacle to the realization of Carney’s strategy. Global Affairs Canada is already beginning to grapple with an expected budget cut of roughly CAD $400 million over the next two years. Investments in defence, artificial intelligence, and critical minerals will require Canada to take on more central debt, which, as of 2024, stands at 64.9% of Canadian GDP. A prolonged war in the Middle East may create further headaches. A recent Oxford Economics report predicts that a six-month closure of the Strait of Hormuz could lead to a 20% loss of global oil supply, resulting in catastrophic price increases and, eventually, a global recession in the second half of 2026. If inflation remains high in this scenario, which would be likely in a scenario of global oil supply constraint, a stagflationary shock may be imminent. This would put immense strain on public spending and likely cause the Carney government to focus inwards on domestic economic management.
The second issue, in some ways related to the first, is generating genuine strategic cohesion among parties when external pressures mount. The challenge in creating common terrain across variable geometry is somewhat like the stag hunt/assurance dilemma in game theory. Agreement on common issues is not the challenge; rather, the difficulty emerges in establishing agreements and, more importantly, trust, to reach an outcome that is objectively optimal for all parties. For example, Canada must be able to credibly demonstrate that it is committed to the region when times get tough and that Ottawa won’t renege, even when there is an incentive to do so.
Carney’s variable geometry foreign policy concept continues to make similar promises of deeper, more sustained engagement with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. The Prime Minister is rightfully pragmatic in his assessment of a new era of renewed great-power rivalry, an era that forces middle powers out of a comfortable complacency about their security and prosperity. A strategy of variable geometry promises much; however, it will be rigorously tested by a looming global energy crisis that may corrode the economic foundations on which the strategy is based. With prudence and tactful negotiation among regional partners, it may yet pay dividends for Canada’s reputation, signalling that it is truly ready to take the good times with the bad.
Disclaimer: Any views or opinions expressed in articles are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the NATO Association of Canada.
Photo credit: Gordon Leggett. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution – Share Alike 4.0 International License.
